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We could go on for some time citing accolades heaped upon Rahner, scanning the thousands of bibliographical items linked to his name, or tallying the millions of copies that his works have sold. But enough. Rahner's stature is beyond dispute. Given his stature and brilliance, and given the profound way in which he has addressed the core of theology, i.e. the meaning of grace, any theologian worth the name must come to grips with his thought. In that sense it functions as a watershed in contemporary theology. In this essay I explore this thesis by first examining Rahner's conception of grace in its radical distinction from and inextricable unity with nature. Then I examine two opposite directions in which the theological waters flow in response to Rahner and seek an explanation for the contrary assessments of his thought implicit in these opposite moves. Finally, I entertain the possibility that these diverging assessments point to a basic tension within Rahner's thought. This
The full significance of Rahner's understanding of grace becomes apparent only when it is understood in contradistinction to and in relation with its correlate, nature. After subjecting the classic teaching on nature and grace to a thorough critique, Rahner sets his hand to an innovative reconstruction of this framework. It is pervasively present in his work. Rahner has written seminal essays in which he sets forth his understanding of the traditional framework. 7 Usually it is only hinted at in the qualification of grace and all it entails as "supernatural." Often Rahner brings the nature-grace schema to bear explicitly on the theme under discussion. In an essay published towards the end of his life, he vigorously defends it as a nonnegotiable for Roman Catholic theology. 8 In distinction from grace as God's self-communication, nature comes into being when God creates ot/ier-than-self. 9 Rahner calls the distinction between nature and the supernatural "essential and radical." 10 He contrasts the two realities as involving two different types of causality. Nature results from a unique (divine) mode of efficient causality by which God constitutes something wholly other than self, creates the nondivine.
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Grace on the other hand, is a special instance of formal causality. By speaking of formal causality, Rahner indicates that grace does not effect a new reality but fundamentally affects existent reality. In grace God imparts God's inner being as form of created reality, thus becoming its destiny and end.
12
To present this clean distinction between grace and nature is not to suggest that Rahner deals with them as two separate realms. Indeed, he has channeled considerable energy into the attempt to overcome what he has called the "extrinsicism" of traditional school theology. Such extrinsicism assumes that a person's everyday life takes place by and large in the realm of nature. The realm of grace is conceived of as a mystery-laden superstructure that for all practical purposes hovers above the concerns of daily life, except that God commands that we believe and accept the mysteries of faith. 13 Rahner's major contribution to the discussion of nature and grace lies in developing a conceptual framework in which this extrinsicism is overcome. He does so by turning the entire framework upside down, as it were.
Instead of beginning with nature as a reality that exists as such and can therefore be known in itself, and then proceeding to another order described as supernatural, Rahner begins with grace as God's selfcommunication. This entails a special instance of a general principle concerning plurality in unity. The real unity of a plural reality exists, Rahner maintains, when "something, in order to be able to be itself, creates something other, distinct from itself, as its own presupposition, sets this other over against itself, and retains this posited other in its otherness in unity with itself."
14
The significance of this general principle concerning plurality in unity will become clear when we examine in what way humanity, or the world, is the self-expression of God. At this point it is important to note how Rahner applies this principle to the relationship between grace and nature. Creation, he says, is "the distinct presupposition which the reality of redemption itself creates in order to be able to be itself." 15 The unifying principle of this plurality is the acting God. Rahner proceeds, then, from God's decision to communicate the divine self to something other than self, i.e. to the nondivine. The presupposition for such communication is the existence of a recipient. This recipient must be other than God. God is able simply to create something other than self, without communicating the divine self. In fact, however, nature exists for the sake of the possibility of grace. Thus, in self-communication, God creates nature as the condition of the very possibility of such communication. 16 In the order of God's acts-of which the Trinity is the ontological paradigmthe primordial possibility, the foundational phenomenon is not the creation of something other than self, but the communication of self. Küng's divergence from Rahner becomes apparent in his first book, Justification (1957). 31 While deeply indebted to Rahner's thought, Küng implicitly parts ways with it in substance. I use the terms "implicitly" and "in substance" advisedly, for at first glance the two theologians hold much in common. Küng often uses terminology that harks back to thought-forms akin to those of Rahner. When he deals with the creation as a salvific event, 32 Küng's thought appears to have great affinity with that of Rahner. Küng too emphasizes that the factual creation has its existence in Jesus Christ. Furthermore, he grants the legitimacy, even necessity, of speaking of the supernatural character of the order of salvation. For that reason, he insists, we must distinguish between a double gratuity, namely, "creation and creation in Christ."
33 He maintains that, although all things subsist in Jesus Christ, this "in Christ" has different levels or gradations (Stufen).
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Despite this apparent affinity to Rahner's thought, a significant difference in approach makes itself felt. In the first place, although Küng uses the "natural-supernatural" distinction, it does not play a decisive role. When he considers, for example, whether the reality of humanity being "in Christ" is natural or supernatural, he calls this a largely terminological and therefore secondary question. 35 Secondly, Küng maintains that the strictly supernatural character of the present order can be adequately safeguarded simply by maintaining that another order, one not created in Christ, is possible. 36 Thus he suggests that the question concerning the orders of nature and grace is largely terminological, and insofar as it points to something more, i.e. the gratuity of grace, it suffices to posit an order of nature simply as a hypothetical possibility. In That an important difference between Rahner and Küng manifests itself at this point is corroborated by Rahner's comments on Küng's book. Rahner criticizes Küng's minimalization of the distinction of nature and grace. He maintains that if the eternal covenantal will is to be achieved, God must create the distinction, the gradation, of nature and grace within the created order. The reason for this conditional necessity is that without it grace would not be grace, would not be gratuitous, Rahner insists that human beings as existent must be able to experience grace in its gratuity. 38 For that reason he considers Küng's affirmation that God could have created an order that does not subsist in Christ entirely inadequate to safeguard the gratuitous character of grace. Not a hypothetical order but the present order must be such that creation as nature has sufficient autonomy and independence to receive and experience grace in its uniqueness, i.e. as a supernatural gift, as something not required for the existence and realization of nature as such. 39 Only then can God's self-communication be experienced as grace.
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Similarly, Rahner considers Küng's affirmation that there are grades of "being in Christ" to be inadequate. He insists that the gratuitousness of grace itself has real gradations or levels. The retention of the free will, he explains, may be described as "grace of Christ" in so far as it has its ground in God's resolve with respect to supernatural self-communication in Christ and in the forgiveness it entails, but the free will as such is the "grace" of creation and not "in itself the grace of Christ. The two relate to each other as lower and higher levels, the lower being the condition of possibility of the higher. 41 By insisting on the real distinction and existential reality of nature vis-à-vis grace, Rahner has put his finger on the crucial point at which Küng's thought diverges from his own.
One could say that from Küng's point of view Rahner's theology maintains too great a discontinuity between nature and grace. Moltmann moves in a diametrically opposite direction. He criticizes Rahner for allowing too little room for a basic discontinuity. In a recent essay, he voices his concern about the nonderivable newness and particularity of the revelation of Jesus Christ. In Moltmann's view, Rahner seems to detract from this newness by presenting the Christ event as the explica- 
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Moltmann is concerned not only about maintaining a degree of discontinuity within salvation history. He further insists on a discontinuity between salvation history and the eschaton. Reflecting on the traditional thesis "Grace does not destroy but presupposes and perfects nature," Moltmann accepts the first half but rejects the second, for "it does not expressly distinguish between grace and glory, between history and new creation, between the church and the kingdom of God, between being a Christian and the fulfilment of being human." 44 This approach, he argues, leads to triumphalism and eschatological presumption because glory is assumed to lie hidden in grace. It demands too much of grace, the Church, and the Christian because each is expected to accomplish that which as yet lies beyond reach. 45 Moltmann proceeds to recast the classic formula regarding the relation of nature and grace as follows: "Grace does not perfect nature, but prepares it for eternal glory. Grace is not the perfection of nature, but the messianic preparation of the world for the kingdom of God."
46 While Moltmann agrees with Rahner that Christ did not become incarnate only because of the Fall but also because of the original creation of human beings in the image of God, he does not want to leave it at this continuity. The Incarnation is also a promise of God's future. The one who is in Christ is a new creature. Within Moltmann's conception of futurity this means that one is not human in order to become Christian, but one is Christian in order to be human. 47 Although the last half of this statement could be interpreted in a Rahnerian sense, for Moltmann it marks a stark discontinuity between the terms "Christian" and "human." He claims that the real content of what it means to be human lies in the eschaton. In the present we are confronted with 42 Moltmann's criticism is summarized in his observation that in Rahner's thought the medieval framework of nature and grace is reinterpreted in contemporary terms but is not basically altered. 49 The alteration Moltmann advocates is the injection of a strong dose of discontinuity between nature and grace, and between grace and the eschaton. the end but at the outset of the path of reflection. In fact, it is so fundamental that mystery comes before and conditions human reflection. The mystery of human existence is its infinite openness to God as absolute being. This fundamental reality is truly a mystery because it occurs behind one's back, as it were, since it is the ground of one's being. It is equally appropriate to say that it is ever ahead, beyond one's grasp, because it is the horizon within which every part of life, including the comprehending grasp, takes place. Mystery cannot be comprehended because every act of understanding presupposes a horizon. Thus the horizon is present, yet it is an elusive, receding presence. As absolute being, God is present, yet remote. This is the mystery of human beings considered as "nature." Thus Rahner can describe nature as "the reality of human beings as a unity of spirit and matter in self-transcendence towards God, insofar as this nature is the addressee of the self-offer of God, which on the one hand fulfils the human person by divinization, and yet cannot be demanded by nature."
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But this is not the deepest sense of mystery. The greatest mystery is not God as elusive, receding presence, but God's immediate proximity in self-communication, the bestowal of God's own being on the human person so that the inner being of God becomes-at least as offer-a constitutive principle of human life. When Rahner elaborates the relation of this mystery of grace to the mystery of the human person as nature, he emphasizes the congruity of the mystery of grace with that of nature. He does so by "defining" the human person as "openness," even boundless directedness, towards the infinite mystery of fulness, 54 or simply as emptiness. This is presented in such a way that no prior limits can be placed on this openness. As transcendental spirit, the human person is absolute openness to the fulness of being. 55 Thinking along these lines, Rahner posits a basic continuity between nature and grace. Grace is then projected as lying on a trajectory that is fully in line with that of nature. According to Rahner, the communication of grace is, from the viewpoint of nature as transcendence, conceivable as its appropriate and meaningful goal. 56 In fact, God's self-communication may be seen as the "absolute radicalization of the transcendentality of the human spirit " 57 In other words, since a person is constituted as oriented to absolute being, it is conceivable, though not at all necessary, that God would communicate God's very self to this creature. In this way Rahner uses the notion of "natural" human transcendence at least to make plausible the "super- While the monistic tendency to which Moltmann objects is present in Rahner's reflection on mystery, the dualism that appears from Küng's vantage point lies just beneath the surface. The human person, according to Rahner, is by nature related to absolute being as infinite horizon. Human existence consists of this mystery. But this mystery-identified as horizon-collapses, so to speak, when he explains that in grace that which is beyond the horizon-the being and nature of God-becomes the innermost constituent principle of human existence. It is constitutive of "nature" for the human person to be related to God as to an elusive horizon, but by grace God becomes the inner constitutive principle of human existence. Thus the constitutive relation of human beings to God as remote, elusive horizon seems to be violated when God comes through the horizon in absolute proximity. Rahner seems to admit indirectly the incongruity of the natural mystery of the human person and the bestowal of grace when he defends the gratuitous, supernatural character of grace. At that point he insists that the mystery of grace can be known only by (positive) revelation. Revelation is needed for a knowledge not only of the facticity but also of the very possibility of such divine self-communication. In fact, for Rahner grace seems to qualify as a mysterium stricte dictum by virtue of its incomprehensibility. Indeed, Rahner's own descriptions of the mystery of grace at times suggest that the bestowal of the infinite itself upon the finite-or, as he also puts it, "the penetration of God himself in the non-divine realm of the finite as such"-is an ontological impossibility.
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At the very heart of Rahner's profound understanding of mystery a tension-laden dualism asserts itself between the mystery of nature and the mystery of grace. Moreover, instead of banishing the understanding of mystery as simply "riddles" that come at the end of one's ontology, Rahner seems to have retained it, though reducing it to a single riddle. more than that. It is not merely a conceptual construction about a hypothetical order of "pure nature," i.e. an order apart from grace. Though nature is not present except within the dynamic of grace, that dynamic itself demands that there be a kind of substratum that is sufficiently free and autonomous with respect to grace both for God not to be obligated to communicate God's own being and for the recipient to be able to say yes or no to this gift. 60 Thus, even prescinding from the content of grace, its gratuity demands an ontological distinction and, more than that, an ontological discontinuity between it and nature. When Rahner's understanding of the content of grace is considered, this duality again comes to the fore. Nature is the mere subsistence of a creature in God, in Christ; grace consists of the very nature of God communicated to human beings, divinizing them. 61 The problem of the dualistic and monistic dynamics in Rahner's thought can also be summarized by returning to the notion of the world, and specifically humanity, as the grammar of God's possible self-expres sion. Rahner chooses this metaphor to convey the intrinsic unity of nature and grace, of creation and salvation. Yet, if one were to take only this metaphor as one's guiding star, one would go wrong. Human beings are not simply the grammar of God's possible self-expression in any straightforward sense. One can hardly conceive of the human person as a mere medium of God. God is not a ventriloquist. A person is created to exercise his or her own responsibility before the face of God, to respond to the divine call. Rahner fully acknowledges this, to the point of claiming that God's salvation occurs through human self-salvation. 62 At this point the problems of the gratuity of grace and of the freedom of the human person, problems that arise when the integral unity of grace is in focus, are warded off by an equally strong assertion of their duality.
We could go on citing formulations by Rahner that appear to reflect a monistic dynamic and contrast these to statements asserting a seemingly dualistic vision. 63 One could write this off as simply an inconsistency or a subterranean faultline in an otherwise magnificent system. One could go on and trace these contrary dynamics to a twofold source: the monistic philosophical dynamic of Fichtean vintage, 6313 and the dualistic theological dynamic of the scholastic tradition. However illuminating such analysis might prove to be, much would be lost if one were to be satisfied with wielding merely the dissedting knife. Rahner's thought is not simply the confluence of problematic philosophical and theological legacies. Both the monistic quest and the dualistic safeguard reflect authentic biblicaltheological concerns: the integral unity of creaturely life in relation to God on the one hand, and the "otherness" of God and the gratuity of grace on the other. Rahner's thought is too profound and too sensitive to the multifarious dimensions of creaturely life simply to exchange dualism for monism.
In assessing Rahner's thought, therefore, care must be taken not to fix one's critical sights one-sidedly on the dualistic or on the monistic dynamic in his thought. Such simplistic diagnosis of some of the problems encountered in Rahner's thought suggests an equally simplistic remedy: to move in the opposite direction. This, however, hardly represents an advance; for, rather than moving beyond Rahner, in this way one merely moves opposite one side of Rahner's thought. In other words, critics of Rahner can diverge from him in diametrically opposite directions, and yet become entangled in problems all the more acute because they are no longer held in check by a contrary dynamic. Either way, one loses something of the profundity of Rahner's thought.
WITH RAHNER, BEYOND RAHNER
One can also move in a third direction, which on the one hand is more critical than either of the responses we have considered, yet paradoxically retains more of the riches of Rahner's probing thought. This third direction would involve calling into question the ontological framework within which Rahner does his theology. I am not referring first of all to his transcendental anthropology, which lies beyond the scope of this essay, 64 but more specifically to his ontology of divine self-communication. Many of the problems that suggest monism from one viewpoint and dualism from another may well be rooted in the attempt to get within one's ontological grasp that which is by definition beyond such grasp, i.e. the mystery of God and of grace. This attempt at constructing an inclusive ontology is reflected in the notion of grace as the communication of God's inner being, God's nature, God's triune life. Such language presents no major problems when it is understood as an attempt to convey the fact that in Jesus Christ we are truly dealing with the creator of heaven and earth, that in grace we are truly placed in the most intimate communion with the covenant God, that through the Holy Spirit God goes so far as to set up housekeeping among human beings. But the moment the reality of this intimacy is translated into an ontology of grace-whereby grace is understood as the communication of God's own being in such a way that the recipient is divinized-major problems See n. 4 above.
erupt. Either one stresses the continuity between this ontology and the ontology of nature, at the cost of the unexpected newness of God's acts in salvation history, or one stresses the discontinuity of nature and grace, at the peril of the integrality of life in this world before the face of God.
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This impossible dilemma suggests that the drama of salvation history cannot be captured in an ontology of grace. In any case, the attempt to construct an ontology that embraces grace inevitably faces one with the question of its integration with an ontology of the created order. When Rahner stresses the integral unity of nature and grace, as he predomi nantly does, he seems to jeopardize the dramatic newness of grace or the eschaton. When he stresses the duality of nature and grace, which he does whenever this danger becomes apparent, the integral unity of nature and grace, human history and salvation history becomes problematic. Perhaps Rahner's groundbreaking theology will yield its full fruit when his profound reflections on the mystery of God and grace are (to use one of his favorite terms in this context) radicalized. Rahner rightly main tains that human thought cannot encompass the mystery of existence because this mystery itself envelops human thought as its ground and horizon. Yet the description of grace as the communication of God's inner being which results in the divinization of the human person presupposes that the core of grace can be grasped by human thought and thus translated into an ontological conception. Would it not be more in keeping with this fundamental and profound insight to shrink back from any attempt to unravel this mystery by means of an ontology of God's act of creation and bestowal of grace? If God is truly the mystery presupposed by our being and our thinking, grace cannot be grasped by an ontology, i.e. by a human logos of divine being. When this critical limit of human thought and ontology is respected, both are liberated from the tensions that are built into the nature-grace framework to safeguard it against the conflation of God and human creatures.
The "radicalization" of the mystery of God and of grace may entail the abandonment of the entire framework of nature and grace as it has been handed down to us through the ages. Perhaps that is the true watershed in contemporary theology with which one of its most brilliant practition ers confronts us. Moving on, however, need not mean an impoverishment of theology, for to explore and re-explore this watershed is to fructify the theological enterprise with the full potential of Rahner's thought. 65 John McDermott wrestles with a similar problem in Rahner's Christology: "On the one hand, it is difficult to see how a finite nature can receive an infinite act of existence utterly out of proportion to itself. On the other hand, ascribing a subordinate, finite esse to Christ leads to a conundrum: either the finite esse introduces an ultimate duality in activity and a possible opposition to the divine Esse or its total subjugation to the divine Esse renders it superfluous" ("The Christologies of Karl Rahner-Π," Gregorianum 67 [1986] 309-10).
